PublicAML

Binance hack: a Tornado-funded operator, three test runs the same afternoon, and about 430,737 stolen ETH parked on four wallets

PublicAML · On-chain investigation · 30 October 2026 · updated 31 October, 22:50 UTC

On 29 October 2026 Binance lost about $6.3 billion from its hot wallets on ten chains, the largest crypto theft on record. TRM Labs attributes it to North Korea’s TraderTraitor; Binance blames a compromised engineer’s laptop and says it will cover all losses. About $2.7 billion was frozen within hours by Tether, Circle, Ripple and others. We read the Ethereum, Bitcoin and Tron legs from the chain. The operator wallet was funded with three Tornado Cash withdrawals and ran three EIP-7702 test runs on 29 October before it hijacked Binance 14 at 20:20 UTC. 197,540 ETH and 1.87 billion USDT reached one collector wallet within 24 seconds. 1.175 billion of that USDT was frozen where it landed. What could be moved was turned into ETH through UniswapX, an Aave loan and Uniswap pools. About 430,737 ETH now sits on four attacker wallets that have never sent a transaction. The same operator also pulled 823 million USDC out of a Binance smart account; Circle has blacklisted the wallet that holds it. On Bitcoin, all 18,270.2 BTC sit untouched on 19 addresses. On Tron, 199 million USDT was turned into 638 million TRX; all of it has now passed through one hub and a mesh of wallets primed with exactly 1 TRX, and on 31 October it was bridged out through Relay.link and Symbiosis: 17,302 ETH bought with it sits on 39 fresh Ethereum wallets.

≈430,737 ETH

on four attacker wallets (0x8532…, 0xc887…, 0x897C…, 0x03b0…) with no outgoing transaction as of 31 Oct 22:50 UTC

24 s

between the drain of Binance 14 (20:24:23 UTC) and the second hot wallet’s transfer to the same collector (20:24:47)

1.175B USDT

frozen by Tether on the collector 0x5227… — 63% of the USDT that reached it; only 700M left before the freeze

3 tests

EIP-7702 delegations the operator ran on its own wallets at 13:51, 13:51 and 16:20 UTC on 29 Oct, hours before the real one

Contents

What is known

At about 20:05 UTC on 29 October 2026 Binance wallets began to empty: XRP Ledger first, then Solana, Optimism, Bitcoin, Tron and Ethereum, later Avalanche and Polygon. TRM Labs counts about $6.36 billion across ten chains, including 18,270 BTC and 233.46 million XRP, and attributes the attack to TraderTraitor (North Korea) with high confidence. Binance put its own estimate at about $6.3 billion, paused deposits and withdrawals and said it will cover all losses. Its preliminary account is that a compromised engineer’s laptop let an attacker reach a service container and submit withdrawals; it has not published a root cause. By the morning of 30 October Tether had frozen about 1.77 billion USDT, Circle 825 million USDC, Ripple 40.5 million RLUSD, and the Arbitrum Security Council had moved 8,426 ETH and 74.6 million ARB out of an attacker wallet. Chainalysis has since also attributed the attack to TraderTraitor; its strongest evidence, it says, is on-chain commingling with funds from the Bitget theft, and it counts about $2.8 billion frozen. As of 30 October Binance says deposits are working and withdrawals should reopen in about 45 hours; it has set aside more than $6.34 billion of company funds for the losses. This page covers what we read ourselves on Ethereum, Bitcoin and Tron.

The operator: Tornado Cash money and three rehearsals

The wallet that started the Ethereum attack is 0x7C8601d4645b93cea45F71e118A729332e6B5CA0. Its only money before the attack came from Tornado Cash’s 0.1 ETH pool (0x12D66f87A04A9E220743712cE6d9bB1B5616B8Fc): three withdrawals of about 0.098 ETH at 07:39 and 08:53 UTC on 28 October and 08:23 UTC on 29 October.

On 29 October at 02:28 UTC it deployed a first contract (0x19beE294A6DaAb49c9e5Ab69A5Da6C035C70f2bf). At 13:51 UTC it sent EIP-7702 delegations for two fresh wallets, 0x837810E3Be7a3E89C570E7A01A13d3B566aaFBc3 and 0x9C29BA2DE4b2d6c3630685650663cFE7B70dbB6B, each funded with a few thousandths of an ETH by 0xFD41dA53D1175b29D40599A0e63545067F58f408, and called them at 14:19 and 14:24. At 15:59 it deployed the contract that would take over Binance 14, 0x63e842B054Bd624a465454D533C33F573e9c6fAe. At 16:20 it tested that contract on a third wallet, 0x43AEdb9BAD6219677a2C8D6858321C16988404BD, which 0xe4F9070e1316de2988fc6f869feaD8fb99cC74cd had funded with 1.01 ETH; the wallet was emptied at 16:30, and at 18:20 the same relay sent 1.0822 ETH back to the operator. Two hours later the operator did the same thing to Binance.

Binance 14: one transaction, 50 signatures

At 20:20:59 UTC the operator sent one type-4 transaction to 0x28C6c06298d514Db089934071355E5743bf21d60, the wallet Etherscan labels Binance 14, carrying 50 EIP-7702 authorizations signed by that wallet for consecutive nonces. Only the one matching the wallet’s current nonce was valid; it set Binance 14’s code to 0x63e842B054Bd624a465454D533C33F573e9c6fAe. Pre-signed authorizations for 50 future nonces mean whoever made them could make Binance 14 sign at will; that is a compromise of the signing system, not of a smart contract.

At 20:24:23 UTC the operator called the delegated wallet. In one transaction it sent 167,464.25 ETH and 63 token balances, including 1,615,409,499 USDT and 62.6 million RLUSD, to 0x5227f603C1eE34CE3C06eFe6477003BDfCCB2f8c. Twenty-four seconds later a second wallet, 0xDFd5293D8e347dFe59E90eFd55b2956a1343963d (Binance 16 on Etherscan), sent 28,005.6 ETH, 55.7 million USDT and 25.9 million RLUSD to the same address with ordinary transfers and no delegation. The operator came back to Binance 14 at 20:41, 20:59, 21:04, 21:44, 22:39 and 23:36–23:56 UTC and swept what customers had deposited in the meantime: 2,069.75 ETH and 204 million USDT more. In all, 197,540 ETH and 1,875.46 million USDT reached the collector.

Binance 14 also controls a smart account, 0xEe7aE85f2Fe2239E27D9c1E23fFFe168D63b4055 (a Circle SingleOwnerMSCA), that held Binance’s USDC. In two of the return visits, at 20:41:23 and 20:59:47 UTC, the operator had Binance 14 call that account and send 780 million and then 43 million USDC to the collector. Circle blacklisted the collector; all 823 million USDC are still on it, which is where Circle’s “825 million USDC frozen” sits. The collector also still holds 12,574 XAUT (about $49 million), 27.8 million USD1 and 1,907 PAXG.

The USDT: 1.175 billion frozen, 700 million turned into ETH

Tether froze the collector at 21:01 UTC. Before that, two real USDT transfers left it: 500 million to 0x9749292D74Fd460982d0912eA9515EA24736C762 at 20:30 and 200 million to 0x0Ddf0480016e6bCb2C1F5d190D221FBA1320697e at 20:33. Block explorers also show “transfers” of 400 and 500 million USDT to 0x0DdBA7…0697E and 0x97457d…C762. They are not USDT: they come from a copycat token, sent to addresses built to match the first and last characters of the real ones. This is address poisoning, and the look-alikes are listed below so nobody mistakes them for the attacker. 1,175,464,712 USDT still sits frozen on the collector.

The 500 million went to market makers. Between 20:34 and 20:49 UTC 0x9749292D74Fd460982d0912eA9515EA24736C762 sold about 325 million USDT through UniswapX (reactor 0x00000011F84B9aa48e5f8aA8B9897600006289Be) and to four fillers, and received ETH back. At 21:47 it sent 122,310 ETH to 0xc887aF690E0301CD4edBbCe8F8d31b4EC65B286A. The other 175 million it passed to 0x811f15855476156Ebf86ba3b84faFb8Ceaa4e84C and on to 0xAa246BF639586a6Ba46762D378CE50cA4fc654a0, which still holds 174,999,872 USDT.

The 200 million took a longer road. 190 million went to 0x8d53903625b8e839b9DF4bd28B0EFb1CD6b8639A, which supplied 60 million USDT to Aave v3 at 20:57 and 21:00 and borrowed about 19,762 ETH against it. It sent 23,314.5 ETH and the remaining 130 million USDT to 0x77EDEf23FBd05921c26FE29fcc3A65e14D2ac3eb, which sold about 50 million USDT in Uniswap pools and passed 41,397.81 ETH and 80 million USDT to 0x7Aa4D3029e4C6A8E916300014Ad95B6d6C03BFd1. That wallet sold the rest. 57,891.85 ETH then went through 0xCcBEF95633ADB5Cd2b5038DB5a38d77E726cA263 and 0xb171cA86f82070282138352Ff7111b494060c8c3 to 0x897C80d1a9729E94460e2Bd93178bD5215158DF3 at 21:35 UTC.

Where the ETH is now

Four wallets hold the proceeds and have never sent a transaction:

0x8532FA14ACAf483729C449b8458aedDb900543D4 — 197,460 ETH, sent by the collector at 20:38 UTC on 29 October and 01:14 UTC on 30 October.

0xc887aF690E0301CD4edBbCe8F8d31b4EC65B286A — 137,602 ETH: the 122,310 ETH from the USDT sale, plus 15,292 ETH from 0x7f9DC988B46336aD536828fAD50fa8fA1E5415E3, which sold ENA and WBETH taken from Binance 14.

0x897C80d1a9729E94460e2Bd93178bD5215158DF3 — 78,415 ETH: the Aave and Uniswap route, plus 20,523 ETH from 0x42CDF00c85005630CC8605731B9364F712077810, which sold ONDO and UNI.

0x03b0eE5d82990cFF1bDa48651AC3e436d1a020ea — 17,260 ETH, sent by the collector at 05:15 UTC on 30 October.

None of the four had sent a transaction by 31 October, 22:50 UTC; the only incoming traffic is dust from address-poisoning bots. The attacker still uses the collector: on 30 October it sold 3.5 million DAR and 13.9 million CTSI from it into Uniswap v2 pools.

Together that is about 430,737 ETH, in line with TRM’s “more than 420,000 ETH”. ETH cannot be frozen. Any exchange, bridge or swap service that receives ETH traceable to these four addresses is receiving the proceeds of this theft. 0xF977814e…, which holds about 499,000 ETH and received a batch from the second hot wallet that night, is Binance’s own wallet (Binance 8) and not part of the attacker’s holdings.

Bitcoin: 18,270.2 BTC split into 1,000 BTC pieces and left alone

In block 973,732, at 20:20:06 UTC, eleven transactions moved 18,270.2 BTC out of bc1qm34lsc65zpw79lxes69zkqmk6ee3ewf0j77s3h, a Binance hot wallet with more than 2.3 million transactions, to one fresh address, bc1q0mtc2f5agpkvlq6hhahmfr3hlr55kyfjhl2mnm. The amounts were round to a tenth of a bitcoin (7,636.8, 4,696.6, 2,946.9 and so on), and each transaction returned change to Binance. The total matches TRM’s 18,270 BTC to the decimal.

Within the same block the hub split the money. Each step peeled off exactly 1,000 BTC to a new address and passed the rest on, for example 1,000 BTC to bc1qjwdw6vrzq4vf6hckutvx4ucj86awwv99mxnz7w and 6,636.8 BTC to bc1qt8mrl9uchasf7pqhwlz6ezm9g44x7xj0vs6zqz. Leftovers were merged into bc1qrg025e2pgx0rwya2kpgtj30972p64jt0hn6zyt (832.5 BTC), and at 20:48:14 UTC the last 437.7 BTC went to bc1qxg0l4p6xc50zuv9cl5f0l0wmaxjpg8wcy7s9ra. Thirty transactions in all; after that, nothing.

As of 31 October, 22:50 UTC, the 18,270.2 BTC sit on 19 addresses — 17 holding 1,000 BTC each, one 832.5 and one 437.7 — and none has spent anything. No exchange, THORChain, Chainflip, bridge or mixer deposit appears anywhere in the graph. On 30 October someone sent the hub a dust transaction whose OP_RETURN urges the holder to swap through THORChain and never return the funds; who sent it is not known, and we do not count the sender as the attacker. A further 1,758 BTC left the same Binance wallet in round amounts at 23:16 UTC to a high-volume address that looks like a service or Binance’s own; it is not in TRM’s total and we do not treat it as stolen.

Tron: 612.7 million USDT, 378.7 million frozen, 638 million TRX on the move

On Tron the attacker created TG5iBMQPrDzJJAUM8GMVBf1hRaJ1wvzsGi at 20:19:57 UTC. Binance’s hot wallet TDqSquXBgUCLYvYC4XZgrprLK589dkhSCf seeded it with TRX, then sent 46,384,098 TRX at 20:21:12 and 612,729,468 USDT at 20:22:45. At 20:45 and 20:56 the attacker moved 300 million USDT to TPBkSjkCMn2ckrMuAP8n2J1jdjbw76bKN4. Tether froze the first wallet at 21:09 with 312,729,468 USDT still on it.

TRM reported that 300 million went to a wallet supplying JustLend. The chain shows that TPBkSjkCMn2ckrMuAP8n2J1jdjbw76bKN4 put only 10,000 USDT into JustLend. Between 20:47 and 21:12 it sold 199 million USDT for TRX in a SunSwap-style pool (TSUUVjysXV8YqHytSNjfkNXnnB49QDvZpx). It sent 65.99 million to TCzBTkqn66yApqbYoPezaEQosM5DAd7Y62, which Tether froze at 21:21 with all of it still there. It sent 35 million to two large wallets that also serve many unrelated users, which we do not treat as the attacker’s. At 21:42 it sent 349,860,941.68 TRX to TSpe5HC3PRD2svJcr1YoGszhHk2mtkyZ8A. The first wallet moved its 46.38 million TRX to TRBdWqHnDVSZCVGfgHdKFLQPirQcA2PRki at 00:06 UTC on 30 October. Frozen on Tron: 378,719,468 USDT, the same figure TRM gives.

The TRX is the part that moved fastest. The 199 million USDT sold in the pool came back as 638.17 million TRX (about $210 million), which TPBkSjkCMn2ckrMuAP8n2J1jdjbw76bKN4 passed to TSpe5HC3PRD2svJcr1YoGszhHk2mtkyZ8A in two transfers, 288.33 million at 20:56 and 349.86 million at 21:42. At 10:15–10:20 UTC on 30 October that wallet split it five ways: 158.2 million to TKkH2vH6kyi2QKcMbqym53WMuvdd1xvw6K and 120 million each to TJajtPqDqUGh1Sr1j8ugHoSXBVpaFLLHKT, TCBAz7itvtX5CjBzVMPQdrbwQLN63ao1fk, TL2F4GhnaFVZBZPncHYjwfYZFW44NcfVwj and TAk1xJNWuBYvJHLsUiBFLeuK6xvpQUFYP5. Within 33 hours all five had emptied into TRBdWqHnDVSZCVGfgHdKFLQPirQcA2PRki, the same hub that received the first wallet’s 46.38 million TRX: one at 10:20 on 30 October, the others at 01:01, 07:58, 14:50 and 18:44 UTC on 31 October. The last two, 278.2 million TRX (about $92 million), were still parked when we checked at 12:45 UTC on 31 October.

That hub is where the laundering is happening. On 30 October it sent out about 143 million TRX in chunks of 50,000 to 1.2 million TRX to well over a hundred addresses. Part of the money went into a mesh Chainalysis described: between 02:27 and 02:47 UTC on 30 October TCWhYRMJrT5wgihf3vNNSb3YW2LJfwGuQP sent exactly 1 TRX to each of 88 brand-new wallets, which then received TRX from the hub through four feeder wallets and passed it among themselves — about 121 million TRX went through the mesh, of which about 88 million was the same TRX going round again. On the first day about 38 million TRX went into THORChain’s vaults (their transactions carry THORChain’s OUT: memos), swapped to ETH; nothing more went to THORChain after 11:38 UTC on 31 October.

Between 12:30 and 22:06 UTC on 31 October the hub sent another 261.5 million TRX to 49 addresses, and it still held 55.6 million at 22:51. Almost half, 126.7 million, went to TNhpfKq83wufEKGjBhQFnT7jnxYmyBzH6F, which used JustLend as a mixer: it supplied 127.8 million TRX to JustLend and withdrew it in 38 payments to 16 fresh wallets. Those payments are internal transfers inside the contract call, so ordinary transaction lists show the new wallets receiving TRX from nowhere. The TRX was then swapped to USDT and USDD through SunSwap (140.8 million TRX) and the Bitget Wallet swap router (37.1 million TRX), and taken off Tron through bridges: about $43.5 million through Relay.link (28.3 million TRX and 34.7 million USDT into TXtEs6t2oUWQsNos7m68gbHdE9Q5n6x2oN), about $17.5 million through Symbiosis and $0.66 million through deBridge.

On Ethereum the Relay.link payouts landed on 22 fresh wallets, which passed the ETH on within minutes. At 22:51 UTC on 31 October 39 wallets held 17,302 ETH between them, the largest 1,100.18 ETH, and none of them had sent it anywhere; one more chain was still peeling 15–17 ETH at a time. Every one of them is listed below and filed in our database. We found no deposit to an exchange that we can tie to the attacker. On 31 October 17.4 million USDT did reach three Bybit deposit addresses, but it came out of a Symbiosis contract through two older forwarding wallets and matches none of the attacker’s Symbiosis deposits by amount or time, so we do not attribute it.

When (UTC)FromToAmountTx
28 Oct 07:39:470x12D66f…16B8Fc0x7C8601…6B5CA00.098 ETH
first money into the operator: Tornado Cash 0.1 ETH pool (three withdrawals on 28–29 Oct)
0xd9e590…e59008
29 Oct 08:23:110x12D66f…16B8Fc0x7C8601…6B5CA00.098 ETH
third Tornado withdrawal, twelve hours before the attack
0x18ae9a…8b1cae
29 Oct 13:51:350x7C8601…6B5CA00x837810…aaFBc3EIP-7702 test
first rehearsal: EIP-7702 delegation of a fresh test wallet
0x16b5ac…499dca
29 Oct 16:20:470x7C8601…6B5CA00x43AEdb…8404BDEIP-7702 test (1.01 ETH wallet)
rehearsal with the final delegate contract on a wallet holding 1.01 ETH
0xb2148e…dc5782
29 Oct 18:20:470xe4F907…cC74cd0x7C8601…6B5CA01.0822 ETH
the test money comes back to the operator
0x96cae1…c0ebe5
29 Oct 20:20:590x7C8601…6B5CA00x28C6c0…f21d6050 signed authorizations
type-4 transaction with 50 pre-signed authorizations; one valid, Binance 14 now runs the attacker’s code
0xad9926…51298b
29 Oct 20:24:230x28C6c0…f21d600x5227f6…CB2f8c167,464.25 ETH + 1,615,409,499 USDT + 61 other tokens
the drain: everything in Binance 14 in one call
0x53bd38…88e2f3
29 Oct 20:24:470xDFd529…43963d0x5227f6…CB2f8c28,005.6 ETH
second hot wallet, plain transfers, no delegation
0x51f263…2fd39f
29 Oct 20:24:470xDFd529…43963d0x5227f6…CB2f8c55,739,800.5 USDT
second hot wallet, plain transfers, no delegation
0xd4e08d…d6c49c
29 Oct 20:41:230xEe7aE8…3b40550x5227f6…CB2f8c780,000,000 USDC
Binance’s USDC smart account, emptied by the operator through Binance 14; frozen on the collector by Circle
0xdc102d…e17481
29 Oct 20:59:470xEe7aE8…3b40550x5227f6…CB2f8c43,000,000 USDC
Binance’s USDC smart account, emptied by the operator through Binance 14; frozen on the collector by Circle
0x3b9625…479ca7
29 Oct 20:30:110x5227f6…CB2f8c0x974929…36C762500,000,000 USDT
USDT out before the freeze; sold to market makers via UniswapX
0x68d7d6…ad659a
29 Oct 20:33:230x5227f6…CB2f8c0x0Ddf04…20697e200,000,000 USDT
USDT out before the freeze; Aave and Uniswap route
0x1fc0ef…fac81c
29 Oct 20:38:470x5227f6…CB2f8c0x8532FA…0543D4195,460 ETH
parking wallet 1; never sent a transaction
0x551d79…b02c76
29 Oct 20:59:110x974929…36C7620x811f15…a4e84C175,000,000 USDT
175M USDT set aside
0x1fb992…fb670b
29 Oct 21:08:230x811f15…a4e84C0xAa246B…c654a0175,000,000 USDT
still holds 174,999,872 USDT
0xb6d7d3…e4266f
29 Oct 21:47:470x974929…36C7620xc887aF…5B286A122,310 ETH
proceeds of the USDT sale to parking wallet 2
0xbd7822…8bfa66
29 Oct 20:52:590x0Ddf04…20697e0x8d5390…b8639A190,000,000 USDT
the Aave borrower
0xc0fab3…615183
29 Oct 21:00:110x8d5390…b8639A0x238789…D4086a50,000,000 USDT supplied
60M USDT supplied to Aave v3 in two steps; ~19,762 ETH borrowed
0x65bd82…dec3f6
29 Oct 21:02:350x8d5390…b8639A0x77EDEf…2ac3eb23,314.5 ETH
borrowed ETH plus 130M USDT, sold in Uniswap pools
0x9e7765…0c4673
29 Oct 21:07:350x77EDEf…2ac3eb0x7Aa4D3…03BFd141,397.81 ETH
second swap wallet
0x1171d7…37ceea
29 Oct 21:11:590x7Aa4D3…03BFd10xCcBEF9…6cA26357,891.85 ETH
pass-through
0x6d7e5c…991996
29 Oct 21:16:470xCcBEF9…6cA2630xb171cA…60c8c357,891.8 ETH
pass-through
0x3ccb1b…8e2c5a
29 Oct 21:35:590xb171cA…60c8c30x897C80…158DF357,891.77 ETH
parking wallet 3
0x2552fe…561fb1
29 Oct 22:51:350x42CDF0…0778100x897C80…158DF317,584 ETH
proceeds of other tokens taken from Binance 14
0x1ef5fa…09699c
30 Oct 00:59:230x7f9DC9…5415E30xc887aF…5B286A15,292 ETH
proceeds of other tokens taken from Binance 14
0x45b3c3…3ba81b
30 Oct 05:15:470x5227f6…CB2f8c0x03b0eE…a020ea17,260 ETH
parking wallet 4
0x9edf86…856071
29 Oct 20:20:06bc1qm34l…j77s3hbc1q0mtc…hl2mnm7,636.8 BTC (largest of 11 drain txs, 18,270.2 BTC in all)
Binance BTC hot wallet → attacker hub, one of 11 transactions in block 973,732
82c0b6f2…df04ce
29 Oct 20:20:06bc1q0mtc…hl2mnmbc1qjwdw…mxnz7w1,000 BTC (+6,636.8 BTC to the next step)
first 1,000 BTC piece; the rest moves to the next step
50a9d0ab…7eb109
29 Oct 20:48:14bc1q0mtc…hl2mnmbc1qxg0l…y7s9ra437.7 BTC
last hub payment; unspent since
58bb6e42…20d625
29 Oct 20:21:12TDqSquXB…dkhSCfTG5iBMQP…wvzsGi46,384,098 TRX
Binance hot wallet on Tron → attacker
72f5fbed…5bab9c
29 Oct 20:22:45TDqSquXB…dkhSCfTG5iBMQP…wvzsGi612,729,468 USDT
Binance hot wallet on Tron → attacker
4203af9c…58253e
29 Oct 20:45:51TG5iBMQP…wvzsGiTPBkSjkC…76bKN4100,000,000 USDT
to the hop wallet, before Tether’s freeze
fd8061aa…c06222
29 Oct 20:56:09TG5iBMQP…wvzsGiTPBkSjkC…76bKN4200,000,000 USDT
to the hop wallet, before Tether’s freeze
d40f96e2…4920ee
29 Oct 21:16:18TPBkSjkC…76bKN4TCzBTkqn…Ad7Y6265,990,000 USDT
frozen by Tether at 21:21 with the full amount
55c2524b…67fa5c
29 Oct 21:42:42TPBkSjkC…76bKN4TSpe5HC3…tkyZ8A349,860,941.68 TRX
TRX from the SunSwap-style pool sales
fb5089f5…fa6149
29 Oct 20:56:12TPBkSjkC…76bKN4TSpe5HC3…tkyZ8A288,330,000 TRX
TRX from the SunSwap-style pool sales
4b329d44…8107c4
30 Oct 10:15:21TSpe5HC3…tkyZ8ATAk1xJNW…QUFYP5120,000,000 TRX
split of the 638.2M TRX; this part went on to the hub TRBdWq…, which is dispersing it
9d0904db…35c487
30 Oct 10:18:09TSpe5HC3…tkyZ8ATL2F4Ghn…NcfVwj120,000,000 TRX
split of the 638.2M TRX; this part went on to the hub TRBdWq…, which is dispersing it
16585e96…78c0d1
30 Oct 10:18:42TSpe5HC3…tkyZ8ATCBAz7it…3ao1fk120,000,000 TRX
split of the 638.2M TRX; this part went on to the hub TRBdWq…, which is dispersing it
03742851…8d556e
30 Oct 10:19:24TSpe5HC3…tkyZ8ATJajtPqD…FLLHKT120,000,000 TRX
parked until 31 Oct, then sent on to the hub TRBdWq…
3db47d89…ac8370
30 Oct 10:20:18TSpe5HC3…tkyZ8ATKkH2vH6…1xvw6K158,200,900 TRX
parked until 31 Oct, then sent on to the hub TRBdWq…
aff887c4…762334
31 Oct 14:50:51TJajtPqD…FLLHKTTRBdWqHn…A2PRki120,000,000 TRX
the last parked TRX goes to the hub, which keeps dispersing it
7f799c3c…723a25
31 Oct 18:44:36TKkH2vH6…1xvw6KTRBdWqHn…A2PRki158,200,902 TRX
the last parked TRX goes to the hub, which keeps dispersing it
e8441d62…86a1b6

What this page does not say

It does not say who carried out the attack; the North Korea attribution is TRM Labs’ and Chainalysis’, and Binance has not confirmed it. The method — a wallet taken over through EIP-7702 and sales through UniswapX — is the one we saw in the Bitget hack in September; Chainalysis links the two through commingled funds, but on Ethereum we found no transfer between the attacker wallets on this page and the 281 Bitget attacker addresses we track during the attack window (checked 30 October; two August transfers from Bitget’s own hot wallets to a high-volume wallet that also appears near this case are ordinary withdrawals to a service, not a link). The link may sit on chains or in wallets we have not read. It does not say how the signing keys or authorizations were obtained beyond Binance’s own statement. It does not say that UniswapX, the fillers, Aave, Uniswap, SunSwap, JustLend or any other service did anything wrong: they executed valid orders. The ten-chain total, the XRP, Solana, Arbitrum, Optimism, Avalanche and Polygon figures and the issuers’ freeze totals are TRM’s and Binance’s. The operator’s funding and tests, the Ethereum, Bitcoin and Tron paths, the poisoning look-alikes, the Aave figures and the balances of the four parking wallets are PublicAML’s own reading of the chain on 30 October 2026.

Addresses in this case

Where the ETH sits: four attacker wallets, about 430,737 ETH, no outgoing transaction as of 31 Oct 22:50 UTC (Ethereum)

Where the Tron money went back to Ethereum: 39 attacker wallets holding 17,302 ETH, filled on 31 Oct from Relay.link payouts (balances at 22:51 UTC)

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Sources: TRM Labs, “North Korea steals USD 6.36 billion from Binance”, 30 Oct 2026; Binance statements of 29–30 Oct 2026 as reported by TechCrunch, Axios, NBC News, CNN, CNBC and Al Jazeera; Blockaid’s analysis as reported by TechFlow; Chainalysis, “Binance exploit: latest findings and response”, 30 Oct 2026. Ethereum data via Blockscout; Bitcoin data via mempool.space and Blockstream Esplora; Tron data via TronGrid; read by PublicAML on 30 October 2026, about 10:00 UTC, and re-checked at 17:30 UTC on 30 October and at 12:45 and 22:50 UTC on 31 October; bridge payouts via the Relay.link public API. This is an information resource about transactions between addresses, not financial or legal advice, and it names no individual as responsible for anything.