Kava Lend exploit: one key on Kava and BNB Chain, 49.2M KAVA sold in two hours, and the $612K Relay.link refused
PublicAML · On-chain investigation · 15 November 2026
On 14 November an attacker inflated the interest index of Kava Lend’s dormant BUSD market and borrowed about 55 million KAVA against it. We followed the money. The Kava account that collected the KAVA and the BNB Chain wallet that sold it are the same key, `0x37D7…1042`, and that wallet had been preparing since 6 November: it bought BUSD, bridged it to Kava, and sent a small test transfer through LayerZero. On the day, 49.2M KAVA crossed to BNB Chain and were sold in about two hours. The proceeds left in five directions. The largest single piece, 1,000 BNB swapped into 612,416 USDT, was refused by Relay.link with the status BLOCKED_WALLET. That is the “$612K blocked” in the reports.
49,207,600 KAVA
bridged from Kava to BNB Chain by LayerZero, 14 Nov 2026, 10:02–12:05 UTC
612,416.39 USDT
the Relay.link request marked BLOCKED_WALLET; not paid out as of 15 Nov 2026
750 BNB
taken to Arbitrum as 450,775 USDC through LI.FI, via two one-use wallets
1,082.58 BNB
into four one-time deposit contracts of one service, swept within a minute
Contents
What was reported
Kava Lend is the lending module of the Kava chain. On 14 November an attacker used its BUSD market, a stablecoin Paxos stopped minting in 2023, to inflate the market’s supply interest index and borrow about 55 million KAVA through more than a hundred loans, with a second account clearing each loan to get around the borrowing cap. KAVA fell by roughly 40–47%. Kava said the incident was isolated to Kava Lend and “not an infinite mint”, paused the Axelar bridge and promised a full report. Reports said about 49.2M KAVA went to BNB Chain through LayerZero and was sold for about $2.09M, and that $612K of the proceeds was blocked.
One key on both chains, prepared a week ahead
The loops ran from two Kava accounts, kava1uzx5924cqsutcw365ajs8kkc3rr4vtlyzms255 and kava1v2s266sll8ca5xrs06swmsc00nwwt7u77eufk4, between about 04:00 and 05:50 UTC on 14 November: deposit BUSD, withdraw it, send it to the other account, borrow KAVA, liquidate. From 05:48 to 12:03 UTC the first account sent 49.2M KAVA to kava1xltn9y20smxxav0gwsv7xpr2ww0szyzzga76lv. That Kava address is the bech32 form of the EVM address 0x37D732914F86Cc6eb1E87419e3046A739F011042, and the same address exists on BNB Chain.
On BNB Chain the wallet started on 6 November. It received 13.42 BNB through Mayan Finance, bought about 8,980 BUSD on PancakeSwap and sent it to Kava through the MetaMask Bridge; more BUSD conversions into the same Kava account followed on 6, 8 and 9 November. At 19:07 UTC on 6 November it sent a small amount of KAVA from Kava to its own address on BNB Chain through LayerZero, a test of the exit route it used eight days later.
Sold in two hours, split five ways
LayerZero minted the KAVA to 0x37D732914F86Cc6eb1E87419e3046A739F011042 on BNB Chain in three sends: 149,000, 48,209,600 and 849,000. Between 10:06 and 12:07 UTC the wallet sold all of it: 41.6M through the MetaMask Swaps router, 5.5M through CoW Protocol and 1.99M through Decent. The KAVA balance on BNB Chain is now zero. Then the BNB went out:
Relay.link: 1,000 BNB went through the MetaMask Bridge and LI.FI into 612,416.39 USDT and a Relay.link request to Ethereum for 271.45 ETH, paid to the same address. Relay’s public API shows that request as failed with the reason BLOCKED_WALLET; no payout and no refund are recorded. This is the 612K that was reported as blocked, and it is the only part of the proceeds that is held.
Arbitrum: 200 BNB and 550 BNB went to two fresh wallets, each of which made one transaction through LI.FI (Mayan and LI.FI Intents) and received 121,064.75 and 329,710.69 USDC on Arbitrum. Both have since sent the USDC on. Arbitrum is outside the chains we index, so we stop there.
One service: 200, 400, 250 and 232.58 BNB went to four addresses that turned out to be one-time deposit contracts. Each was created and swept within a minute by the same contract, 0x79001a5e…8920, which batches deposits and offers swaps. We have not identified the operator.
Two more bridges: 500 BNB through the MetaMask Bridge to Bridgers, and the last 27,825.46 USDT through the MetaMask Bridge to Mayan. We have not resolved where either landed.
| When (UTC) | From | To | Amount | Tx |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 14 Nov ~10:03 | 0x000000…000000 | 0x37D732…011042 | 48,209,600 KAVA (+149,000 and 849,000 in two more sends) LayerZero mint on BNB Chain for KAVA sent from Kava | 0x76c349…5f67c1 |
| 14 Nov 10:06 | 0x37D732…011042 | 0xc59017…74c02b | 41,607,616 KAVA → BNB and USDT (about 40 swaps, 10:06–12:07) sold through the MetaMask Swaps router | 0x5973dc…aa0130 |
| 14 Nov 10:24 | 0x37D732…011042 | 0x9008D1…60ab41 | 5,500,000 KAVA → BNB (4 orders) sold through CoW Protocol | 0x362f79…c2a025 |
| 14 Nov 10:30 | 0x37D732…011042 | 0x39b1f7…3882E0 | 1,986,000 KAVA → BNB (2 swaps) sold through Decent | 0x9992c3…50d0b6 |
| 14 Nov 10:47 | 0x37D732…011042 | 0x764796…E71925 | 200 BNB fresh wallet; one LI.FI transfer via Mayan, 121,064.75 USDC on Arbitrum | 0x1eeaf8…1d942d |
| 14 Nov 10:50 | 0x37D732…011042 | 0x8ff50F…181C89 | 550 BNB fresh wallet; one LI.FI Intents transfer, 329,710.69 USDC on Arbitrum | 0x35f98b…fe64e8 |
| 14 Nov 10:50 | 0x37D732…011042 | 0xaEc231…604B59 | 500 BNB MetaMask Bridge, routed to Bridgers | 0x438ef1…c1762f |
| 14 Nov 10:53 | 0x37D732…011042 | 0xaEc231…604B59 | 1,000 BNB → 612,416.39 USDT → Relay.link via LI.FI to Relay.link; request failed, BLOCKED_WALLET | 0xb844e4…1ca79f |
| 14 Nov 11:00 | 0x37D732…011042 | 0x448497…9B723D | 200 BNB one-time deposit contract, swept into 0x79001a5e…8920 | 0x785137…393fc3 |
| 14 Nov 11:21 | 0x37D732…011042 | 0x44dF35…CD3Be8 | 400 BNB one-time deposit contract, swept into 0x79001a5e…8920 | 0xcb0e0a…be7d65 |
| 14 Nov 11:43 | 0x37D732…011042 | 0xA35151…041D75 | 250 BNB one-time deposit contract, swept into 0x79001a5e…8920 | 0x45082d…3a1584 |
| 14 Nov 11:49 | 0x37D732…011042 | 0x478324…9AA690 | 232.58 BNB one-time deposit contract, swept into 0x79001a5e…8920 | 0xfd4633…99e45e |
| 14 Nov 12:08 | 0x37D732…011042 | 0xaEc231…604B59 | 27,825.46 USDT MetaMask Bridge, routed to Mayan | 0xe63992…084d53 |
What is left on Kava
Not all of the KAVA crossed. The first attacker account also sent 2.61M KAVA to one Kava address, 1.5M to a busy account with nearly 800 transactions, and 170,000, 150,000 and 150,000 to three fresh accounts. One of those, kava134vun6a7xqcznvcdqa5f88nr2hc5u55l47ezdv, still holds its 150,000 KAVA. The second account swapped 150,000 KAVA for BTCB on Kava’s own exchange. We list these amounts without saying who controls the receiving accounts.
The dust next to every transfer
Seconds after each BNB transfer, an address that starts and ends like the recipient sent the attacker a fraction of a cent, for example 0x764F77A4…1925 after the payment to 0x76479609…1925. That is address poisoning by an unrelated bot hoping the sender copies the wrong address next time. Those addresses are not part of the case.
What this page does not say
It does not say who the attacker is, and it does not say that MetaMask, CoW Protocol, Decent, LI.FI, Mayan, Bridgers, Relay.link, Squid, Axelar or LayerZero did anything wrong: they are routes the money took. The description of the bug and the 55M figure come from Kava and the press; the accounts, amounts and routes are on chain and anyone can check them.
Addresses in this case
The attacker’s wallet on BNB Chain; the same key as the Kava account that collected the KAVA
Kava accounts that ran the BUSD loops (attacker), the KAVA collector (same key as above) and an account still holding 150,000 KAVA
- kava1uzx5924cqsutcw365ajs8kkc3rr4vtlyzms255
- kava1v2s266sll8ca5xrs06swmsc00nwwt7u77eufk4
- kava1xltn9y20smxxav0gwsv7xpr2ww0szyzzga76lv
- kava134vun6a7xqcznvcdqa5f88nr2hc5u55l47ezdv
Two one-use wallets that took 750 BNB to Arbitrum as USDC through LI.FI (attacker)
Four one-time deposit contracts that received 1,082.58 BNB, all swept into the same service contract (service, not the attacker)
Routes the money passed through: MetaMask Swaps router and Bridge, CoW Protocol, Decent (services, not the attacker)
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Sources: Kava’s statement on X, The Block, CoinCentral and FinanceFeeds (14–15 Nov 2026) for the method, scale and the reported block; Kava chain data via its public REST API (transactions of the attacker accounts, MsgEthereumTx calldata of the LayerZero sends to endpoint 30102, BNB Chain); BNB Chain via a public node and BscScan; LI.FI and Relay.link request status via their public APIs. Balances checked 15 Nov 2026, 21:00 UTC.
