Meter Passport exploit: the “$2.3 million” was printed, not taken
PublicAML · On-chain investigation · 30 September 2026
On 24 September 2026 Blockaid flagged an exploit of Meter’s Passport bridge on BNB Chain: an attacker minted wrapped MTRG with nothing behind it, about $2.3 million worth. Meter says the root cause was a block-validation flaw on its own mainnet and has suspended the bridge. We went through the attacker’s wallet on BNB Chain transfer by transfer. The $2.3 million is the price-tag of the tokens that were printed, not money anyone walked away with: MTRG was trading around $0.0015, the PancakeSwap pools were shallow, and the attacker’s sales on BNB Chain returned a few hundred dollars.
1 billion
wMTRG minted to the attacker wallet, 24 Sep 13:26 UTC
~$420
what those sales returned on BNB Chain, in total
400M
wMTRG pushed into pools whose swaps then failed
0
attacker mints or dumps of MTRG on Ethereum, 22–28 Sep
What happened
Passport is Meter’s bridge. On BNB Chain it mints wrapped MTRG, 0xbd2949f67dcdc549c6ebe98696449fa79d988a9f, when its relayers confirm MTRG was locked on Meter’s own chain. According to Meter, a flaw in block validation on Meter mainnet let an attacker get fake confirmations through, so the bridge minted tokens that nothing backed. At 13:26 UTC on 24 September it minted 1,000,000,000 wMTRG to 0xEe2EEEED4Ed8580669ED924abEb49f27f7D0Bd65. That wallet had been given its gas a minute earlier by 0x44cf94496091150865E192A86c07B90a9760b43D, which itself was funded through Gas.zip the day before.
A billion tokens at the last traded price looks like millions of dollars, and that is where the headline figure comes from. But a price only means something if someone will pay it, and on BNB Chain almost no one could.
What the attacker actually got
At 13:35 the attacker put 100 million wMTRG into the PancakeSwap MTRG/BUSD pool, 0x4dcA4D427511bC327639b222DA18FA5e334F686F, and the pool paid out about 120 BUSD for it. Between 14:02 and 14:05 it transferred another 400 million straight into the MTRG/BUSD and MTRG/WBNB pools, 0xb95568F806fdBc05DfD51737F27bf1623b3Ee9D2 — but each of its own swap calls that followed failed. Tokens sent into a pool without a completed swap are simply there for whoever swaps next, so whatever those 400 million were worth went to other traders and bots, not to the attacker. A further 50 million sold for 0.0065 WBNB, a few dollars.
It also sent 1.3 million wMTRG back into the bridge, 0x8209815136b35F21B8C0f5AA2E2f915a73530dF9, in two deposits. The last 448.7 million it held until 27 September and then sold on Uniswap v4 for 295.6 USDT, which went to the funding wallet two minutes later. Added up, the attacker’s sales on BNB Chain returned roughly $420 for a billion tokens.
On Ethereum, where wrapped MTRG has the same contract address, there were no mints to the attacker and no large sales between 22 and 28 September — only ordinary trading.
| When (UTC, 2026) | From | To | Amount | Tx |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 24 Sep 13:26 | 0x000000…000000 | 0xEe2EEE…D0Bd65 | 1,000,000,000 wMTRG unbacked mint by the bridge | 0x87858b…9ffbc6 |
| 24 Sep 13:35 | 0xEe2EEE…D0Bd65 | 0x4dcA4D…4F686F | 100,000,000 wMTRG the pool paid out ~120 BUSD | 0x1f6ef3…86b824 |
| 24 Sep 13:48–13:57 | 0xEe2EEE…D0Bd65 | 0x820981…530dF9 | 1,300,000 wMTRG sent back into Passport | 0xa71708…34b387 |
| 24 Sep 14:05 | 0xEe2EEE…D0Bd65 | 0xb95568…3Ee9D2 | 200,000,000 wMTRG sent into the pool; the swap that followed failed | 0xf02879…59f4d2 |
| 24 Sep 14:05 | 0xEe2EEE…D0Bd65 | 0x4dcA4D…4F686F | 200,000,000 wMTRG sent into the pool; the swap that followed failed | 0x396a85…c501c4 |
| 24 Sep 14:08 | 0xEe2EEE…D0Bd65 | 0xb95568…3Ee9D2 | 50,000,000 wMTRG sold for 0.0065 WBNB | 0x7af24b…12ff72 |
| 27 Sep 19:45 | 0xEe2EEE…D0Bd65 | 0x28e2Ea…E9e9dF | 448,700,000 wMTRG sold on Uniswap v4 for 295.6 USDT | 0x381ee2…9240b5 |
| 27 Sep 19:47 | 0xEe2EEE…D0Bd65 | 0x44cf94…60b43D | 295.6 USDT proceeds to the funding wallet | 0xc2e70c…078f88 |
Who does lose
The damage is real, it just is not a pile of stolen dollars. Holders of MTRG saw a flood of unbacked supply hit a thin market, and liquidity providers in the BNB Chain pools were left holding tokens worth next to nothing: by 28–30 September, trades of 150,000–400,000 wMTRG in the MTRG/BUSD pool were returning a few tenths of a dollar. Meter has not yet said what happens to the unbacked supply.
What this page does not say
It names nobody, and it covers BNB Chain only. The exploit itself happened on Meter’s mainnet, which we have not traced; any value the attacker took there is not counted here.
Another address, 0x7db6ac6F…, was named in some early coverage. We do not treat it as the attacker. It has bridged MTRG through Passport and traded it on KuCoin and Gate since February 2022, and its two bridge-ins of 1,000,000 wMTRG on 24 September fit that history in dollar terms. Without more evidence we are not listing it.
The two attacker-side addresses on this page — the minting wallet and its funder — are listed on our incident page for this event.
Sources: BNB Chain data read on BscScan on 30 September 2026; Ethereum data from Blockscout; Blockaid’s alert of 24 September for the event and the $2.3M figure; Meter’s statement for the cause. “About $420” adds what the attacker’s completed sales returned (≈120 BUSD, 0.0065 WBNB, 295.6 USDT). This is an information resource about transactions between addresses, not financial or legal advice, and it names no individual as responsible for anything.